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SYSTEMATISCHE PHYLOGENIE DER WIRBELLOSEN THIERE (INVERTEBRATA). Von *Ernst Haeckel*. Zweiter Theil. Berlin: Georg Reimer. 1896. Pages, 720. Price, 17 M.

The readers of *The Monist* are perfectly familiar with the character of Professor Haeckel's present work, the first and third parts of which we reviewed on their original appearance (see *The Monist*, Vol. V., p. 451, and Vol. VI., p. 311), so that we have now merely to note the publication of the second part which treats of the phylogeny of the invertebrates. The entire work is now complete. It is marked by the same qualities as all of Professor Haeckel's books,—lucidity of style and breadth of view; and when we remember that the vivid hypothetical picture which the author here offers of organic ancestral history is the net result of thirty years of hard, fruitful labor in this domain, we can approximately grasp its worth and import. Professor Haeckel's indefatigable pen is never idle, and we have also to record the publication of a large quarto brochure of 177 pages on the phylogeny of the Echinoderms, with many handsome plates (*Die Amphorideen und Cystoideen* Leipsic, Engelmann).

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SOCIOLOGIA E FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO. By *Lorenzo Ratto*. Turin: Unione-Tipografico-Editrice. 1894. 8mo, pages, ix+178.

STATO E LIBERTÀ: SAGGIO DI SCIENZA POLITICA. By *Lorenzo Ratto*. Savona: A. Ricci. 1890. 8mo, pp. xii+118.

These two volumes cover in part the same ground. In the preface to the first we are told that in it are summed up the results of various investigations which may be published later on. Its seven chapters are devoted to the following subjects: The relation between philosophy and science, social philosophy, the conception and limits of natural sociology, the sociological problem, the crisis of the philosophy of law, and the task of juridical sociology. The second volume considers the natural formation of the state, the state as a living organism, and liberty as the foundation of juridical and political institutions. Both volumes are valuable contributions to the modern task of clearing up the conceptions of the branches of knowledge they discuss, and the relation of these branches to other disciplines.

Especially interesting is the author's conception of sociology. In this country the drift of expert opinion on the question as to whether sociology is a philosophy or a science seems to be toward the conviction that it is a correlating and co-ordinating philosophy. Dr. Ratto, however, while granting the existence and importance of a social philosophy, called by him sometimes general sociology, maintains that there is also a place for a science of sociology. Philosophy, which he limits to the consideration of concepts and problems not peculiar to any science but common to all, he divides into three sections corresponding to the three groups of sciences—Cosmology, Biology, and Sociology. The last of these groups he divides into three sub-groups: natural sociology, moral sociology, and political sociology. Natural sociology includes a group of sociological sciences not yet carefully distinguished,

such as pure sociology, which should investigate the laws of the formation and evolution of the social organism, its physiology, psychology, etc., and "all the sciences contained in embryo in modern sociology." Moral sociology embraces the social sciences, moral and historical, and political sociology includes juridico-political sociology, which he thinks should take the place of the philosophy of law, and all the juridical and political sciences (*Sociologia e filosofia del diritto*, p. 13). We thus see that according to his view general sociology or social philosophy is a synthesis of three groups of sciences, one of which includes the science of sociology. To the conception and limitations of this science he devotes a chapter.

Inasmuch as the principal task of the science of sociology is, according to Dr. Ratto, the determination of the nature of the social organism, it is not surprising to find him denying to Comte the honor of being the founder of sociology and bestowing the same upon Espinas, who sought an answer to the question, "What Is Society?" by a careful study of animal societies. The limitation of sociology to the study of human societies is, according to our author, a relic of the old anthropocentric idea. It is only by going back to sub-human social life that we may hope to discover the origin and nature of society. From the lowest form of animal society to the most highly complex human society of to-day the line is as unbroken as it is from protoplasm to man.

It may be thought that the conception of sociology here outlined is open to the criticism that there is no distinction between sociology and biology. Dr. Ratto considers this criticism and shows that it is invalid. He admits that these sciences are closely related. Biology, however, studies the individual, while sociology studies the group. Between the group and the individual there are fundamental distinctions. To say, as Fouillée does, that every individual is a society and every society an individual, is an abuse of language (*stato e liberto*, p. 49). But even if this were true biology studies only those societies in which the units do not constitute individuals physiologically distinct or distinguishable (p. 57).

While many will not admit that the argument of Dr. Ratto in favor of a new science is convincing, all will agree that his discussion is one of the ablest that has thus far appeared. Many indeed are disposed to regard all attempts to define and limit sociology as premature. A science, like almost everything else, is a growth. If sociology is really a science we need have no fear that it will reveal itself as such as it develops from the embryonic stage. Our chief present concern should be to collect material. Until there is a residue of facts of sufficient proportions to engage our attention we cannot be sure that there is need or room for a science.

Something should be said in regard to the conception of the philosophy of law which is expressed in these volumes. A few words from the preface of the former volume will perhaps make it clear. "The principal point," says Dr. Ratto, "to which I would call the reader's attention, is the attempt at a division of the old 'philosophy of law, galvanised by the actual philosophic movement. into two new 'and quite distinct sciences, one of which may still be called the philosophy of law,

"although the name is not appropriate, and which has for its object the investigation of juridical ideals and the laws of their realisation ; the other called juridical sociology, a name equally inappropriate but not easily improved, which has for its object the new studies upon the natural formation and evolution of juridical and political phenomena."

These volumes and others which have lately appeared in Italy illustrate a fact not well enough known in this country, and that is that Italian thought on sociological subjects is abreast of that in any other country. I. W. HOWERTH.

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. A Contribution to some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics. By *L. T. Hobhouse*, Fellow and Assistant-Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. London : Methuen & Co. 1896. Pages, xx, 627. Price, 21 shillings.

Mr. Hobhouse thinks the time has arrived for an attempt to fuse what is "true and valuable in the older English tradition" with the newer doctrines of Lotze and Hegel. We shall limit ourselves to giving our readers a general idea of the contents of the book, which we may say at once is deserving of careful study.

In his Introduction the author tells us what he understands by philosophy. This is a synthesis of the sciences—"of all that is known, and . . . of much also that is only felt or hoped." To this synthesis the theory of knowledge contributes only one element, that which concerns "the conditions of genuine knowledge and of certain broad aspects of the results or tendencies of knowledge which seem to be bound up with any just conception of its conditions." The subject is highly complex, and that the reader may have a guide to the line of thought pursued, the author begins his work by pointing out, that in regard to any statement whatever three questions may be asked—as to the grounds on which it is made, its meaning, and its truth—and that these questions deal respectively with the conditions, the contents, and the validity of our knowledge as a whole. The discussion of the subject follows these lines.

The work is divided into three parts, the first of which treats of the *Data* with which the theory of knowledge is concerned. Chapter I. deals with Apprehension, used in the sense of sensation or perception, which is the starting point of knowledge. Its content is fact, within which may be included space and time, as well as qualities and relations. Memory, and Construction, which appears first as "memory-synthesis," and is based on comparison operating by analysis or abstraction, engage attention in the next two chapters. The remainder of Part I. is devoted to a discussion of particular and general Ideas, Resemblance and Identity, and of the nature and different kinds of Judgment, which the author speaks of as the acceptance or assertion of an idea "involving a suggestion of, or reference to reality. In the chapter treating of "The Validity of Judgment" he considers the objections to categorical judgments. Here he concludes that space and time are not proved unreal by infinite divisibility or infinite extent. Part II. of Mr. Hobhouse's work deals